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This paper analyzes the relationship between unofficial economy (UE) and official 
GDP.  Through  the  study  of  the  UE  within  an  institutional  comprehensive  empirical 
framework, a positive correlation is found between unofficial and official GDP. Empirical 
evidence on the procyclicality of UE supports the conclusion that the two sectors are rather 
complements  than  substitutes  for  Latin  American  countries.  Then  UE  is  considered  as 
beneficial  to  sustain  economic  growth.  Suggestions  for  economic  policy  and  hints  for 
further research are also offered. 
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1.  Introduction 
One of the most discussed questions in the literature on the Unofficial Economy  (UE) is about its 
interactions with the official GDP . Various researches have recently investigated the overall sign of 
the impact of the UE on the economic performance but they have often yielded different results (e.g. 
Dell’Anno, 2003; Schneider and Klinglmair, 2004; Schneider, 2005; Galli and Kucera, 2003; Dreher et 
al., 2007). These controversial outcomes hold the hypothesis that in UE, beneficial and damaging 
effects coexist on the growth of official GDP. In this research, we attempt to determine which effect 
prevails in Latin American countries.  
On the one hand, UE may damage economic performance. Klinglmair and Schneider (2006), 
Giles (1997a, b), and Giles et al. (2002) state that rising UE leads to a considerable erosion of the tax 
base, resulting in a worse provision of public infrastructure and basic public services. Finally, it leads 
to lower official growth. UE is also considered one among the causes for the inefficient functioning of 
the  goods  and  labor  markets.  It  introduces  distortion  of  competition  within  economic  sectors  and 
among national economies (Dell’Anno, 2007).  A  growing UE  may  attract workers away from the 
official economy and create unfair competition between unofficial and official firms (Enste, 2003). 
Due to the exclusion of the unofficial activities by both credit market and public programs for business 
development,  irregular activities rather than regular ones hinder increase in size and initiation of large-
scale business strategies. In this sense, UE may be a constraint to hinder industrial development and 
transition process. UE may also slow down the economic growth by affecting the social capital and 
ruining the institutional setting. Hidden activities favor corruption and link with criminal activities . UE 
increases  lack  of  trust  in  the  institutions  and  feeds  resentment  among  citizens.  It  harms  involved 
workers by depriving them of rights and guarantees. Furthermore, UE may hamper policy making as it 
questions the reliability of the national account aggregates.  
On  the  other  hand,  UE  provides  beneficial  effects  to  the  official  economy.  According  to 
Schneider and Enste (2000), UE creates an extra-added value that can be spent in the official economy.  
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They estimate that at least two-third of the income earned in unofficial market is immediately spent in 
the official economy, thus having a positive effect on the latter. According to Kaufmann and Kaliberda 
(1996),  the  UE  has  had  a  positive  side  during  the  transition  period,  providing  beneficial  market 
experience to the nascent entrepreneurs. According to Thomas (1992), the irregular activities facilitate 
the transition by acquiring skills necessary for future development. According to Smith (2002), UE 
helps  in  the  employment  of  some  individuals  who  would  otherwise  be  unemployed  and  provide 
services  that  would  otherwise  be  unavailable.  Further  advantages  of  UE  derive  from  equity 
prospective. Usually people with low personal income are involved in informal production activities. 
Therefore, UE may modify (reduce) the distribution of income in society . In this sense, for countries 
with high unemployment rate, the informal sector may represent a social buffer. In the following, we 
attempt  to  assess  as  to  which  of  the  previous  effects  lead  to  the  correlation  between  official  and 
unofficial GDP.  
The  analysis  of  correlation  between  the  two  sides  of  economy  has  also  been  examined  in 
literature  using  a  Granger  causality  approach.  This  econometric  approach  aims  to  determine  the 
direction of causal influence between measured and hidden economy. Giles (1997a, 1997b, 1999a) and 
Giles and Tedds (2000) carried out these tests for New Zealand and Canada, respectively. In both the 
countries, they found a significant evidence of Granger causality from the measured economy to the 
UE. They concluded that the UE “follows the measured economy through the cycle, rather than vice 
versa” (Tedds and Giles, 2000, p. 9).  
According to Galli and Kucera’s (2003) study on the movements over business cycle of the 
informal employment, the formal employment tends to be procyclical and informal employment to be 
countercyclical. Similarly, Calderon-Madrid (2000) showed procyclical movements of workers from 
informal  into  formal  employment.  Consequently,  UE  may  yield  beneficial  effects  to  stabilize  the 
business cycle fluctuations.  
A further contribution on the negative or positive effects of UE prevailing on official GDP is 
given by Schneider (2005). He estimated a quantitatively important influence of UE on the growth of 
the  official  economy.  Empirical  evidence  revealed  correlation  between  changes  in  these  two 
phenomena according to the degree of economic development. In particular, Schneider (2005) found a 
negative  correlation  between  UE  and  official  economy  for  developing  countries  and  a  positive 
relationship for industrialized and transition ones . This outcome implies that UE could be procyclical 
for developing economies and countercyclical for developed and transition countries. 
A relevant question for any econometric analysis of UE is the endogeneity issue. To control 
them, we apply a dynamic panel approach as proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). It offers many 
advantages for researchers; for instance, this technique allows both for controlling for the potential 
endogeneity of all explanatory variables and for removing any bias created by unobserved country-
specific effects (Sendeniz-Yuncu et al., 2007).  
This  paper  examines  the  economic  reasons  behind  interactions  between  UE  and  official 
economy by taking into account the institutional setting in the econometric framework. It means the 
union of two strands of literature: the research that examines UE by following an institutional approach  
with the analyses of the interactions between UE and the official GDP. This research differs from 
others  on  the  following  aspects:  it  considers  a  comprehensive  institutional  setting  for  empirical 
examination. According to Giles (1997a, 1997b), Giles and Tedds (2000), and Hametner and Schneider 
(2007), this study develops a cross-country analysis for a group of comparable countries. It should 
reduce  the  sources  of  heterogeneity  with  respect  to  a  worldwide  analysis  as  well  as  allow  for 
generalizing empirical findings with respect to a single-country approach. A conversion of the UE 
estimates having the same unit of measure as that of the measured GDP is proposed here. From the 
best of our knowledge, this issue has not been taken into account in the literature. Not surprisingly, this 
question assumes fundamental relevance to investigate the interactions between official and unofficial 
GDP.  In  particular,  we  transform  Schneider’s  (2005,  2007)  estimates  of  the  UE  as  percentage  of 
official GDP into unofficial GDP measured on purchasing power parity (PPP) per capita. Finally, we  
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infer some suggestions to design more effective economic policies to effectively fight UE without 
endangering the official economic development. 
This  article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of the empirical researches 
analysing the relationship between official and UE. Section 3 describes the panel data model applied. 
Empirical outcomes are discussed in Section 4. The article ends with general conclusions. An appendix 
with data sources and variable definitions is provided. 
 
 
2.  What  do  we  know  about  the  interactions  between  unofficial  and  official 
economy? 
Much of what we know today about the effects of UE on official economy, and vice versa, has been 
learned  both  from  comparative  and  single-country  studies.  Although  this  literature  has  unearthed 
significant information on economic policies practices in a score of countries, these studies have been 
subject to two main limitations. First, literature is still lacking in a widely accepted theory of UE that 
universally  works  for  each  country  and  time-period.  Second,  invariably  the  authors  have  found 
extremely difficult-to-compute reliable UE estimates. The limited reliability of the shadow economy 
estimates  undermines  the  empirical  assessments  of  theoretical  statements  on  the  effects  of  UE.  A 
number of these studies is discussed here to make a widespread overview on how the UE affects, 
and/or is affected by, the official economic development.  
According to Chen (2007), there are at least three schools of thought on link between informal 
and  formal  economies:  dualism,  structuralism,  and  legalism.  The  “dualists”  argue  that  unofficial 
activities have few linkages to the official economy but, rather, operate as a separate sector.  This 
approach is based on the neoclassical hypothesis that rigidities in the official sector, introduced through 
legislation  or  negotiation,  segment  the  market  (Harris  and  Todaro,  1970).  The  dualist  hypothesis 
asserts that these two sectors are subsidiaries through common factors that lead to the flow of workers 
and activities from formal to the informal economy. 
The “structuralists” consider the informal and formal sectors as intrinsically linked.  Formal 
enterprises promote informal production and employment relationships with subordinated economic 
units and workers to reduce their input costs (Chen, 2007). According to this approach, both informal 
enterprises  and  informal  wage  workers  are  inclined  to  meet  the  interests  of  increasing  the 
competitiveness of regular firms, providing cheap goods and services (Moser, 1978; Portes et al. 1989). 
Consequently, growing official economy boosts unofficial production. 
The  “legalists”  direct  their  interest  on  the  relationship  between  informal  activities  and  the 
formal regulatory environment, not formal firms (Chen, 2007), which is attributed to the fact that the 
capitalist interests collude with government to set the formal “rules of the game” (de Soto, 1989). 
Another viewpoint to examine the economic consequences of UE on official economy is based 
on the analysis of the nature of this relationship. It means that the interest of economist is to know if 
substitution effects prevail on complementary ones. When the complementarities between unofficial 
and official economy overcome the substitution effects, larger UE should stimulate the official growth. 
It fits the structuralist hypothesis. The economic explanation is that the value-added created in the UE 
is spent (also) in the official sector. At the same time, more official production increases the demand of 
unofficial goods and services. Various studies have supported the hypothesis of beneficial effect of UE 
on economic development. For instance, Adam and Ginsburg (1985) estimate a positive relationship 
between the growth of the UE and the official economy under the assumption of low probability of 
enforcement. Lubell (1991) considers as significant the influence of the UE on the development of 
official economy. Bhattacharyya (1999) shows clear evidence in case of the United Kingdom (from 
1960  to  1984)  that  the  UE  has  a  positive  effect  on  several  components  of  GDP  (e.g.  consumer 
expenditures, services, etc.). According to Asea (1996), UE offers significant contributions “to the 
creation of markets, increase financial resources, enhance entrepreneurship, and transform the legal, 
social, and economic institutions necessary for accumulation” (ibidem, p. 166). Enste (2003) argues  
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that UE stimulates economic development in transition countries. He considers the shadow economy as 
an incentive to develop both the entrepreneurial spirit and a constraint to limit an excessive growth of 
the government activities. Schneider (2003) emphasizes that UE, stimulating higher competition, leads 
to more efficient resource allocation on both sides of economy. Again, by assuming complementarities 
between  UE  and  official  GDP,  Schneider  (2005)  claims that  the  unofficial  activities,  boosting  the 
economic growth, is also able to generate additional tax revenues. Further empirical evidence of a 
positive correlation between UE and official economy are also found by Tedds (2005), Giles (1999a, 
1999b), Giles and Tedds (2002), Bovi and Dell’Anno (2007), and Hametner and Schneider (2007). 
The alternative hypothesis that substitution effects between unofficial and official GDP prevail 
on  complementarities,  is  basically  based  on  the  idea  that  unofficial  activities,  creating  unfair 
competition, interferes negatively with the market allocation.  
From the demand side, a lack of transparency may distort the information flows, thus making 
difficult market competition and an efficient comparison of goods and services. From production side, 
the untaxed return of investment of the unofficial business activities may attract resources from official 
firms. It is due to the fact that more productive investments of official activities may have lower taxed 
returns than unofficial ones. Then the misallocation slows down economic growth . Feige and McGee 
(1989)  point  out  the  damaging  consequences  caused  by  anticyclical  monetary  and  fiscal  policy 
measures when UE is not taken into consideration by the policy maker. Macroeconomic stability and 
economic reforms to sustain economic growth are thus harder to attain. Loayza (1996) found empirical 
evidence of negative correlation between the size of informal sector and the growth rate of official real 
GDP per capita for 14 Latin American countries. The inverse relationship between UE and economic 
growth  is  theoretically  supported  by  author’s  hypothesis  on  shadow  economy’s  congestion  effect. 
Loayza  (1996)  set  out  a  model  where  the  production  technology  depends  on  tax-financed  public 
services, and the informal sector does not pay taxes but must pay penalties and these resources are not 
used to finance public services. According to these assumptions, larger UE reduces the availability of 
public services to the official economy than do the existing public services which are being used less 
efficiently. Ihrig and Moe (2000) reveal that the movements in the size of UE have an economically 
significant and negative effect on the growth of real GDP per worker. By examining the UE in 24 
transition countries, Eilat and Zinnes (2000) found an inverse relationship between official and UE. 
They estimated that a one-dollar fall in official GDP was associated with a 31-percent increase in the 
size of the UE. Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996) observed that UE mitigates the decrease in official 
GDP of transition countries. They estimated that for “every 10 percent cumulative decline in official 
GDP, the share of the irregular economy in the overall increases by almost 4 percent” (ibidem, p. 46). 
Schneider  and  Enste’s  (2000)  overall  survey  of  76  countries  concludes  that  a  growing  UE  has  a 
negative impact on official GDP growth. Ihrig and Moe (2004) estimate a negative convex relationship 
between real GDP per worker and the percent of output produced in the informal sector. According to 
Chong and Grandstein’s (2007) findings, a large informal sector implies, inter alia, slower economic 
growth. Among the other scholars that find a negative relationship between UE and official economy: 
Frey and Weck-Hannemann (1984); de Soto (1989); Turnham et al. (1990); Thomas (1992); Johnson et 
al. (1998, 1999); Friedman et al. (2000); Ott (2002); Dell’Anno (2003); Dabla-Norris and Feltenstein 
(2005);  Dell’Anno et al. (2007); Dell’Anno (2007). 
As  this  survey  has  summarized,  the  literature  presents  contradictory  results.  A  noteworthy 
contribute to reconcile these findings come from Schneider’s (2005) research. He finds that the effects 
of the UE on the official economic growth are just prima facie ambiguous. The sign of correlation 
becomes well defined if it is conditioned to the degree of economic development. He estimated a 
negative relationship between the UE of low-income countries and the official rate of economic growth 
but a positive relationship between UE and economic growth in industrialized and transition countries . 
Schneider’s motivation was that the citizens of high-income countries are overburdened by taxes and 
regulation so that an increasing UE stimulated the official economy as the additional income earned in 
the UE was spent in the official sector. On the contrary, for low-income countries, an increasing UE  
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“erodes the tax base, with the consequence of a lower provision of public infrastructure and basic 
public  services  with  the  final  consequence  of  lower  official  economy”  (Schneider,  2005,  p.  613). 
Schneider (2005) stated that the effects of UE on the economic development should be evaluated by 
considering the beneficial effects that a lower size of the UE has in terms of tax revenue. In other 
words, to discover hidden tax base means additional resources for policy maker, thus leading to more 
resources for investment in productive public goods and services. By this viewpoint, if the policy 
maker has lack of resources to finance public investments (e.g. infrastructures, education, etc.), as in 
low-income countries, then lower UE makes possible the promotion of the economic growth through 
finance policies. 
With reference of structural characteristics of Latin American UE, it is important to consider 
the workers’ mobility between formal and informal employment. In these countries, the informal labor 
is  considered  one  of  the  most  relevant  components  of  UE  .  In  this  sense,  a  negative  relationship 
between official and UE in Latin America may be lead by the flow of workers from formal to informal 
labor  market.  A  number  of  studies  investigate  on  this  issue.  Among  these,  Funkhouser  (1997), 
Maloney (1999), and Calderon-Madrid (2000) give empirical evidence on substantial flow of workers 
back  and  forth  between  formal  and  informal  employment.  Galli  and  Kucera  (2003)  assess  that 
“informal  employment  serves  as  a  macroeconomic  buffer  for  formal  sector  employment  over  the 
course of business cycles, with informal employment expanding during downturns and contracting 
during upturns (ibidem, p. 17)”.  
Both Schneider (2005) and Galli and Kucera (2003) state that the relationship between official 
and unofficial side of production is not intrinsic, but it depends on the economic development and the 
institutional factors characterizing the country and time-period under analysis. By taking into account 
their statement, the next sections will attempt to examine the sign of correlation between UE and 
official GDP through an institutional framework where the two-way interactions between official and 
unofficial economy are estimated through a dynamic panel model. 
 
 
3.  Data Issues and Econometric Model 
Until few years ago, quantitative analyses of interactions between variables such as UE, indexes of rule 
of law, economic freedom, and labor regulation have been virtually impossible. Fortunately, the recent 
availability of data on the scope of institutions’ performance and UE now makes such a study possible. 
In particular, we refer of Schneider’s (2005, 2007) estimates of the UE as percentage of official GDP 
and recent releases of the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom Index (Gwartney et al., 2007). The 
collected data set consists of seven data points of time (1990, 1995, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004) of 
19 Latin American and Caribbean countries
1. The sample is restricted to a subset of selected Latin 
American countries owing to data limitations for smaller economies and available estimates of UE. 
Then  by  considering  a  group  of  comparable  countries,  it  is  possible  to  reduce  the  sources  of 
heterogeneity among the economies under observation. It should increase the reliability of the data 
analysis. Furthermore, since many Latin American countries had or still have a tradition of high UE, 
weak  institutions  and  different  economic  performances,  these  countries  are  considered  an  optimal 
sample to test the hypotheses of this research.  
Our panel data include the following variables
2: unofficial Gross Domestic Product based on 
purchasing-power-parity  (PPP)  per  capita  (UE);  GDP  based  on  PPP  per  capita  (GDP  cap); 
unemployment rate as percentage of labor force (Unem); labor market regulation (LR); hiring and 
firing of workers (HF); rule of law (RoL); stable rates of inflation (σ[infl]); income inequality (Gini); 
transfers and subsidies as a share of GDP (Subs), and an index of top marginal tax rate that also 
                                                 
1 The list of countries in the sample is shown in Appendix (Table 3). 
2 We consider two additional variables as instruments for GMM estimators: an index of freedom to trade internationally 
(Free Trade index) and the inflation rate (infl). See appendix for details.  
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considers the income threshold to which it applies (Tax). Details on dataset sources and definitions of 
variables are given in Appendix.  
With regard to the econometric approach, we apply a panel analysis to test empirically the 
theoretical hypotheses. Alternative types of panel model specification can be suitable for our analysis. 
One type of panel model has constant coefficients, referring to both intercepts and slopes. In the event 
that there are not significant fixed effects, we could pool all of the data and run an ordinary least 
squares  regression  model.  In  contexts  like  this  one,  the  question  usually  arises  as  to  whether  the 
individual specific effects should be assumed to be fixed (Fixed effects model) or random (Random 
effects model). According to Baltagi (2008), the fixed effects model is the appropriate specification if 
the analysis is focusing on a specific set of N units and the inference is restricted to the behavior of this 
set of units. The Random effects model, on the other hand, is an appropriate specification if we are 
drawing N individuals randomly from a large population and want to draw inferences about the entire 
population. Finally, since pooling amounts to applying (linear) restrictions on the coefficients, an F-test 
can be used, where a restricted model is compared with an unrestricted model. We compute F-tests in 
order to test the statistical significance of countries and time-fixed model specification
3. The pooling 
tests  reveal  that  both  the  fixed  country  and  the  fixed  country  and  time-effects  specification  are 
preferable to the pooled case.  
In models for pure time-series data and for pure cross-section data, respectively, disturbance 
serial correlation and disturbance heteroskedasticity often requires attention. Since panel data combine 
both data types, it may be wise to give both of these departures from the assumptions for disturbances 
in classical regression models due attention. In our dataset, estimation of a static panel model shows 
significant first-order autocorrelated errors. Then, a dynamic fixed effects model is considered the 
proper specification in our research. Equation (1) shows this type of panel model specification: 
γ β α λ ε − ′ = + + + + , , 1 , , i t i t i t i t i t y y x             (1) 
where  =1,2,...,19; i  and  = '90,'95,'00,'01'02,'03,'04. t   αi  and  λt  are  used  to  capture  the 
cross-country  and  time  (fixed)  effects,  respectively;  , i t x  is  a  vector  of  exogenous  regressors  and 
( ) ε ε σ ∼
2
, 0, i t N
 is a random disturbance.   
The estimation of fixed-effects dynamic panel data models has been one of the main challenges 
in econometrics during the last decades. The review of the study by Arellano and Honore (2001), 
Arellano (2003), and Baltagi (2008) can be found in the literature. The seminal paper of Nickell (1981) 
showed that in dynamic panel regressions, the LSDV only performs well when the time dimension of 
the panel is large (Judson and Owen, 1999). In consequence, bias reduction procedures have been 
proposed for practical implementation with a variety of dynamic panel estimators (e.g. Kiviet, 1995; 
Hahn and Kuersteiner, 2002). The development and comparison of such new estimators was necessary 
because the traditional least-squares dummy-variable estimator is inconsistent for fixed T. Various 
instrumental variables estimators and generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators have been 
proposed and compared (e.g. Anderson and Hsiao, 1981; Arellano and Bond, 1991;  Kiviet, 1995; 
Judson and Owen, 1999). Beck and Katz (1995, 1996) state that “Panel Corrected Standard Errors" 
(PCSE) estimator is able to take account of panel heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation 
of the error terms
4. Unfortunately, PCSE properties hold for time dimension greater than 15 (Beck and 
Katz, 1995). In our panel the time dimension is 7; therefore, it is likely that the Nickell bias
5 will be 
                                                 
3 This test suggests that model specification with both countries and time fixed effects is a better specification than the 
pooled model.  
4 Monte Carlo experiments showed that PCSEs are very close to OLS standard errors when the Gauss-Markov assumptions 
hold, and can be considerably better than OLS standard errors when those assumptions are violated so long as T > 15 (Beck 
and Katz, 1995). 
5 Nickell (1981) shows that OLS estimation may be inconsistent when applied to models that include fixed effects and a 
lagged dependent variable. The bias is of the order 1/T, where T is the time dimension of the panel.  
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large  and  PCSE  estimators  may  be  not  appropriate.  According  to  Judsen  and  Owen  (1999),  for 
unbalanced panel and T < 10, generalized method-of-moments (GMM) is the best estimator. Arellano 
and  Bond  (1991)  propose  to  eliminate  the  country-specific  effect  by  first  differences,  however,  it 
introduces a new econometric problem. The new error term in the difference equation is now correlated 
with the lagged dependent variable. It implies to use GMM estimator. The consistency of the GMM 
estimator depends mainly on the assumptions that the error terms do not exhibit serial correlation and 
that the instruments are valid. To check whether these assumptions hold, we run Sargan’s test and 
serial correlation tests on residuals. Failure to reject the null hypothesis of these tests implies that the 
assumptions of the estimation hold true. In the next section, to check the robustness of estimates, the 
results  obtained  with  both  GMM  (Arellano  and  Bond,  1991)  and  PCSE  (Beck  and  Katz,  1995) 
estimators will be shown. 
 
 
4.  Results and Discussion of Econometric Analysis 
In the following, the effects of UE on the official economy (equation 2), and vice versa (equation 3), 
are compared in a wide-ranging framework where both institutional and macroeconomic variables are 
included. These models are specified in a symmetric way in order to better compare the different 
effects of regressors for sustaining or hindering the official or unofficial GDP.  
  , , 1 ,
0 1 2 3 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 infl , 8 , 9 , ,
, , 1 ,
LR+ HF
i t i t i t U U U U U U U U U U
i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t
UE UE GDP
Gini RoL Unem Subs Tax
Pop Pop Pop
α δ β β β β β β β β σ β β ε
−
−
= + + + + + + + + + + +    (2) 
, , 1 ,
0 1 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 infl , 8 , 9 , ,
, , 1 ,
LR HF
i t i t i t O O O O O O O O O O
i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t
GDP GDP UE
Gini RoL Unem Subs Tax
Pop Pop Pop
α δ β β β β β β β β σ β β ε
−
−
= + + + + + + + + + + + +    (3) 
Table 1 shows estimates of equations (2) and (3). The columns labeled “PCSE” report estimates 
obtained  by  applying  Panel  Corrected  Standard  Errors  method  useful  to  obtain  robust  covariance 
estimators to heteroskedasticity across cross-sections and general correlation of residuals. In PCSE (II 
and V),  the model specification country fixed effects are included, whereas in PCSE (I, IV), both 
country and time fixed effects are included. We omit to report the dummies for the sake of brevity.  
The columns GMM (III) and GMM (VI) report estimates according to the method proposed by 
Arellano and Bond (1991). GMM estimators take into account the fixed effects through first difference 
of cross-countries. The unofficial and official GDPs are transformed in logarithms.   
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Table 1:  Estimates of eq. (2): columns I, II, III; Estimates of eq. (3): columns IV, V, VI 






















Lagged Dep. variable  0

















Log GDP per capita  1









--  --  --  -- 
Log UE per capita   --  --  --  --  1









Income  Inequality 
(Gini)  2

















Labour Regulation  3
















Hiring and Firing  4













Rule of Law  5















Unemployment rate  6
















Stand. Dev. Inflation  7
















Subsidies on GDP  8















Marg. tax rate index  9














Observations    70  70  45    72  72  47 
Fixed effects   
Country 
& Time  Country 
∆ 
country   
Country 
& Time  Country 
∆   
country 
Sargan Test*(p-value)        0.69        0.47 
AR(1)  0.87   0.23  Serial  corr. 










1.371  0.82 
a Denotes significant at 1% level; 
b Denotes significant at 5% level; 
c Denotes significant at 10% level.  
*The validity of instruments for the estimates is tested using the null hypothesis of the Sargan test. The higher the p-
value of the test, the more confidence we can have in not rejecting the null hypothesis of instruments used are not 
correlated with the residuals from the respective regression. Failure to reject the null hypothesis of Sargan’s test and 
serial correlation tests implies that the assumptions of the instruments hold. 
For PCSE (I) the F-tests for countries and time dummies is: F-stat=27.14>F(22,37) at 1%[p-value =0.00]. For PCSE 
(II) the F-tests for countries dummies is F-stat=32.52>F(17,42) at 1% [p-value =0.00]. For PCSE (IV) the F-tests for 
countries and time dummies is F-stat=40.51>F(22,39) at 1% [p-value =0.00]. For PCSE (V) the F-tests for countries 
dummies is F-stat=39.31>F(17,44) at 1%[p-value= 0.00]. 
For  GMM  estimators  two  types  of  instruments  are  applied.  GMM  (III)  applies  as  dynamic  period-specific 
(predetermined) instruments the lags of dependent variable (log of unofficial GDP per capita) from 2 to the last 
periods of the sample; as strictly exogenous instruments the first difference of the following variables as: Rol HF, 
σ[infl], Tax, Gini(t-1), Inflation. GMM (VI) applies as dynamic period-specific (predetermined) instruments the log 
of official GDP per capita from t-2 to the end of sample; as strictly exogenous instruments the first difference of 
following variables: Rol HF, σ[infl], Tax, Gini(t-1), Free Trade index.  
 
A  preliminary  statement  helps  to  interpret  appropriately  the  empirical  findings.  As  a 
consequence  of  insufficient  time  dimension  of  panel,  we  cannot  investigate  specifically  on  the 
directions of causation between unofficial and official GDP (e.g. by performing Granger causality tests 
as in Giles, 1997a, 1997b, 1999a). Therefore,  outcomes are regarded as correlations. In the following, 
we focus our attention mainly on GMM estimates.   
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First, we find a statistical significance of the first-order autoregressive term of lagged UE. This 
result supports the analyses of UE by means of dynamic framework. It holds the view that economies 
with large size of UE, suffer from persistent informality. Due to dynamic modeling of UE, several 
papers emphasize the existence of multiple (stable and unstable) equilibria (e.g. Gordon, 1989; Kim, 
2003; Rosser et al., 2003). Indirectly, our findings provide evidence for their approach.  
In absolute term, the persistence of unofficial GDP is estimated to be greater than official GDP 
( ) 0 0
U O β β > . Thus, we deduce that if “big push” strategies are adopted to escape from “irregularity 
traps”, they need more massive coordinated policies with respect to the case of “poverty traps”
6.  
With reference to the question as to whether the complementarities between unofficial and 
official GDP prevail on substation effects, we find affirmative answer for Latin American countries. 
This  result  points  out  that  the  unofficial  and  official  GDP  per  capita  are  strictly  and  positively 
correlated. The UE thus sustains official economic development. A positive elasticity of  1 β  means that 
the two phenomena move cyclically. Consequently, the interpretation of UE as macroeconomic buffer 
for official sector does not find empirical evidence in our sample. Due to fluctuations in statistical 
significance of estimates over the estimator approaches, we cannot be totally confident if the elasticity 
of official GDP to unofficial income ( ) 1
O β  is lower or higher than the elasticity of unofficial GDP to 
official production( ) 1
U β . 
As  concerns  the  effects  of  income  inequality  on  GDP,  the  index  of  Gini  is  statistically 
significant for both regressions, but it assumes different signs. It means that an increase of income 
inequality (higher index of Gini) is related to higher unofficial GDP ( ) 2 0
U β > . On the contrary, more 
equal income distribution is correlated with richer (official) economy ( ) 2 0
O β < . The result of  2 0
U β >  
corroborates the recent studies that investigates on correlation between Gini coefficient and the size of 
UE (e.g. Rosser et al., 2000, 2003 for transition countries; Winkelried, 2005 for Mexico;  Chong and 
Grandstein, 2007 for 57 industrial and developing countries). These studies find evidence that high 
inequality leads to a large informal sector; therefore, redistribution policy decreases the size of UE.  
By comparing the estimates of  2
U β  with 2
O β , an initial suggestion for policy maker may be 
provided. To reduce income inequality, it is effective to sustain official GDP as well as to lower 
unofficial  GDP.  Moreover,  as  2 2
U O β β <  the  ceteris  paribus  marginal  effects  of  a  reduction  in 
inequality increases the overall (official plus unofficial) GDP. Then reduction in income distribution 
may be considered one of the most effective policies to both increase total GDP and lower unofficial 
GDP.  
With  regard  to  the  labor  market  variables,  rigid  labor  regulations ( ) 3 0
U β >  is  correlated  to 
higher UE, whereas it is not related to the official GDP ( ) 3 0
O β = . These outcomes reveal that without 
adequate labor regulation, the goal of the decrease of UE becomes more difficult to achieve. The UE 
can thus be considered as one of the costs for rigid, lacked, incomplete, or inadequate reformation of 
labor market. The indexes of hiring and firing workers regulation and the perception of rule of law 
( ) 4 5 0 β β = =  are not significant.  
We  find  that  the  (official)  unemployment  rate  is  negatively  correlated  with  official  GDP 
( ) 6 0
O β <  while, unexpectedly, it is also negatively correlated with the UE. This unforeseen result may 
                                                 
6 According to the literature on development economics, an effective strategy to move from bad to good equilibrium is the 
“big push theory” proposed by Rosenstein–Rodan (1943) and more recently by Murphy et al. (1989). They sustain that in 
market, coordination failure leads to an outcome (equilibrium) inferior to a potential situation where resources would be 
correctly allocated and all agents would be better off. For a critical overview of this literature, see Esterlin (2006).   
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depend on scarce reliability of official statistic for countries where informal employment involves large 
part of Latin American people (Tokman, 2007). However, statistical significance holds true only when 
GMM estimator is applied. This should suggest prudence to interpret this outcome.  
From table 1, as much a government is able to follow policies and adopt institutions that lead to 
stable rates of inflation7 then both UE and official GDP will decrease.  This outcome confirms the 
hypothesis that inflation is detrimental for both official economic development (e.g. Barro, 1995) and 
unofficial GDP (e.g. Schneider, 2005).  
With reference to variable “Subsides on GDP”, lower index of monetary transfers as percentage 
of  country  GDP  from  government  to  citizens  is  correlated  with  higher  unofficial  GDP  ( ) 8 0
U β < . 
Whereas  the  relationship  between  the  government  subsidies  and  the  official  production  is  not 
statistically  significant  ( ) 8 0
O β = .  We  infer  that  more  generous  are  the  government  transfers  and 
subsidies as a share of GDP (e.g. unemployment benefits) and lower will be the incentive to move 
from informal to formal employment.  
In  literature,  one  of  the  most  popular  determinants  of  the  UE  is  taxation.  The  common 
hypothesis is that an increase in the tax rate is a strong incentive to work in the unofficial sector. To 
address the potential endogeneity of tax rate with respect to UE, we employ both top marginal statutory 
rates and  instrumental variables approach. We suppose it to help in alleviating this problem. In Latin 
American countries, the top marginal income tax rate index has no statistically significant correlation 
with official or unofficial GDP ( ) 9 9 0
U O β β = = . This outcome has important value in a normative point 
of  view.  It suggests  that  participation  in  UE  for  Latin  American citizens  is  not a  consequence of 
excessive  marginal  income  taxation.  The  income  and  substitution  effects  caused  by  changes  in 
statutory marginal income tax rates probably counter-balance their effects for irregular workers and 
entrepreneurs. Due to these reasons, economic policies that stress on flat rate income tax to sustain 
economic  growth  and  to  move  business  activities  from  informal  to  formal  economy  seem  to  be 
ineffective.  
In  accordance  with  previous  outcomes,  we  may  state  that  to  sustain  both  Latin  American 
economic development and reduce the size of UE, the policy maker should reduce income inequality 
through higher marginal income tax rates and by liberalizing labor regulations. 
The  second  econometric  exercise  is  devoted  to  assess  the  hypothesis  of  (counter)  cyclical 
relationship between growth rates of official and unofficial economy. According to Kaufmann and 
Kaliberda (1996), countries that show a decline in official GDP were able to mitigate such a drop 
through a growth in the UE. On the contrary, Chong and Gradstein (2007) find a positive relationship 
between  UE  and  official  growth.  To  test  this  hypothesis  in  regression  (4),  elasticities  of  the  two 
components of the growth rate of total GDP are estimated:  
, , 1 , ,
0 1 2 ,
, , 1 , ,
i t i t i t i t
i t i t
i t i t i t i t
Tot Tot UE GDP
Growth Growth Growth Growth
Pop Pop Pop Pop
α δ φ φ φ ε
−
−
       
= + + + + +                
       
    (4) 
The estimates are reported in Table 2. 
 
                                                 
7 We utilize an index of variation  in the rate of inflation over the five-year period  instead of the inflation rate to reduce 
endogeneity issue.  
  11 










   
 
 




































 first difference  




SUR  -- 
Durbin-Watson stat[PCSE] 
Sargan Test¤ [GMM] 
  1.282  1.179  p-value=0.84 
F-test Fxed effects(p-val)[PCSE] 
Serial Corr.res(p-val) [GMM]   
1.01>F(22,65) 
at 1% [0.47] 
0.72>F(18,69) 
at 1% [0.78] 
AR(1)=0.73 
AR(2)=0.02 
Observations    91  91  46 
See notes of table 1. For GMM as dynamic period-specific (predetermined) instruments we use the growth rate of 
total GDP per capita from t-2 to the end of sample; as strictly exogenous instruments the first difference of following 
variables: Rol, HF, σ[infl], Tax, Gini, Free Trade index. 
 
According to outcomes shown in table 2, the hypothesis that UE serves as a macroeconomic buffer 
for official sector is rejected. Thus, we may state that unofficial and unofficial growth rates are in sync. 
It  holds  the  proposition  that  unofficial  sector  amplifies  the  total  (official  plus  unofficial)  GDP 
fluctuations. The cyclical pattern of UE is consistent with the view that movements from formal to 
informal employment are not largely voluntary.  
Due  to  the  low  frequency  of  observations,  we  cannot  use  time-series  econometric  methods  to 
investigate the dynamics of business cycle fluctuations. Then we simply show the effects of unofficial 
GDP on the variability of total production by comparing the coefficient of variations (Figure 1). The 
coefficients of variation (CV) is calculated by dividing the estimated standard deviation for the mean 
for each country.  
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According to these estimates, the unofficial GDP per capita has ever higher dispersion than 
official  GDP  per  capita.  Then  we  deduce  that  total  GDP  fluctuations  may  be  amplified  by  UE. 
However, further research has to focus on this inference. 
 
 
6.  Summary and Concluding Remarks 
The UE is a persistent worldwide phenomenon. Several studies attempted to integrate the UE into 
macroeconomic models in order to study their effects on the allocation of resources and economic 
development. Unfortunately, no common view emerges about the sign of the effects of the UE on 
official economy and vice versa. The current lack of consolidated theory and empirical evidence, as 
well as the quality of available data, makes this field difficult to research. In this paper, two strands of 
the empirical literature are combined. The first deals with the influence of the official economy on the 
UE  and  vice  versa,  and  the  second  with  the  role  of  institutional  setting on the  UE.  An  empirical 
analysis based on an unbalanced panel of 19 Latin American countries from 1990 to 2004 is proposed. 
We  first  estimate  the  regressions  with  PCSE.  Although  this  approach  correctly  controls  for 
unobservable fixed country and year effects as well as heteroskedasticity across cross-sections and 
general correlation of residuals, it may provide biased estimates as the right-hand-side variables may be 
endogenous. Taking advantages of the dynamic nature of data, we also perform GMM estimations 
(Arellano and Bond, 1991). This approach involves the addition of a set of instruments consisting of 
suitable lags of the level of the explanatory, exogenous, and dependent variables for each cross-section 
involved in the panel.  On the basis of empirical outcomes, a strong positive correlation is found 
between the official and unofficial economy.  
A  preliminary  remark  has to  be  made before summarizing  policy implications  and  general 
conclusions. The  empirical analysis of the UE must be valued very carefully. There does not exist any 
common methodology for estimating the UE; furthermore the estimates are never very strong and 
absolute. Therefore, any empirical analysis using UE estimates necessarily is subject at least to the 
same  caveats.  Again,  additional  limitations  for  the  reliability  of  the  econometric  exercise  can  be 
highlighted; among these, even ignoring measurement errors and the effect of omitted variables, the 
most  relevant  is  probably  an  issue  of  endogeneity.  All  that  means  that  the  empirical  results  are 
surrounded by significant margins of uncertainty that the exercises proposed here can realistically offer 
only some indicative correlations and that further and deeper analyses are paramount.  
We draw the following conclusions. There is a strong interaction of the UE with institutional 
indicators and official economy. The UE has a positive and quantitatively important effect on the 
official  economy  and  vice  versa.  It  supports  the  hypothesis  that  these  two  sectors  are  rather 
complements than substitutes. The UE in Latin American countries sustains the growth of official GDP 
because it mainly creates additional resources to reinvest in the economy. There are initial evidences 
that, as a consequence of procyclical pattern of UE, business cycle fluctuations may be amplified by 
shadow economy. 
In terms of policy suggestions, we deduce that in poorly institutional context as Latin American 
countries, a simple cut of upper tax rates may not be effective to reduce the size of the UE. The best 
strategies to boost official GDP and lower UE seem to be a reduction of income inequality,(higher 
marginal income tax rate better then higher subsidies) and liberalization of labor market regulation. 
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Appendix 1: Data definitions and sources 
The (unbalanced) panel used for estimating panel regressions consists of a cross-section of 19 countries 
over 7 time periods and for 11 variables (1463 obs.). However, the missing values reduced the span of 
the sample with 68 observations: 30 in Gini; 12 in LR and HF; 5 in Subs; 4 in UE and Unem; 1 in Tax.  
Data on the UE are published by Schneider (2005) for the 1990 and 1995 and Schneider (2007) 
for the 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2004. These articles collect different sources and consider the 
currency demand approach and (Dynamic) Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes method to estimate UE 
as percentage of official GDP. To improve the reliability of comparison between unofficial and official 
GDP, we convert both the indexes of gross domestic product in the same unit of measure. In particular, 
Schneider’s estimates of UE as percentage of official GDP are converted to the levels of Unofficial 
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 for the GDP per capita at current national currency and divided to the implied PPP 
conversion  rate  as  published  by  World  Economic  Outlook  Database  (2007)
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.  The  calculated  unofficial  GDP  (PPP)  per  capita  used  in  the  analysis  is 
reported in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Unofficial GDP per capita (PPP) 
 
   1990  1995  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 
Argentina  1672.3  2628.5  3165.3  3266.3  3127.2  3420.4  3578.9 
Bolivia  972.9  1291.9  1615.0  1672.2  1707.2  1749.1  1805.2 
Brazil  1828.1  2449.5  3011.8  3158.7  3343.3  3400.0  3547.0 
Chile  652.9  1242.2  1866.3  1999.4  2113.2  2155.0  2221.7 
Colombia  1595.9  2215.3  2474.5  2666.8  2857.3  2954.4  3109.1 
Costa Rica  1224.2  1742.1  2310.0  2406.5  2543.2  2638.3  2695.5 
Dominican Rep.  1017.9  1399.3  2169.2  2369.6  2533.6  2526.1  2637.0 
Ecuador  778.4  1024.7  1140.6  1305.4  1388.0  1437.4  1520.4 
El Salvador        2154.5  2261.9  2358.7  2422.5  2456.1 
Guatemala  1111.0  1491.5  1931.8  1986.2  2031.7  2016.8  2042.9 
Honduras  806.5  1022.1  1264.2  1328.0  1376.5  1401.2  1430.6 
Jamaica  971.1  1180.4  1335.1  1432.7  1510.1  1580.5  1600.4 
Mexico  1517.5  1896.5  2770.6  2955.6  3115.5  3124.2  3264.5 
Nicaragua  1038.3  1167.3  1479.7  1572.7  1612.8  1666.2  1730.6 
Panama  1901.1  2867.0  4010.7  4127.1  4226.8  4365.7  4562.3 
Paraguay        1357.9  1468.3  1660.2  1786.4  1944.5 
Peru  1780.4  2371.9  2631.1  2713.7  2731.5  2757.0  2871.5 
Uruguay  2419.4  3512.0  4598.0  4548.7  4133.3  4198.5  4652.9 
Venezuela  1312.6  1731.0  1955.6  2141.5  2036.9  1852.2  2157.3 
 
Data on GDP based on purchasing-power-parity (PPP) per capita are available from World 
Economic Outlook Database (2007) - April Edition.  
Data on the Rule of law are available from the Fraser Institute, which elaborates an index 
running from 0 to 10 (lower numbers mean worse legal environment). In particular, we use as index of 
rule of law the Area 2 of the Index of Economic Freedom, so called “Legal Structure and Security of 
Property Rights” published by Gwartney et al. (2007)
9. The key components accounted by this index 
                                                 
8 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2007/01/data/index.aspx. 
9 Data retrieved from www.freetheworld.com.  
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are: rule of law, security of property rights, independent judiciary and impartial court system. 
According with Bertola (1990), rigid labour regulations may discourage formal firms to fire 
during downturns and to hire workers during upturns as they take into account the risk of incurring 
high costs of dismissal in the following downturn. Consequently, the variability of regular employment 
in response to output fluctuations is expected to be lower where job security regulations are tighter 
(Galli and Kucera, 2003). To take into account the labour market, three variables are considered: two 
indicator of Fraser institute (the overall index of labour regulation and the hiring and firing index) and 
the official unemployment rate. The labour-market index measures the extent to which restraints upon 
economic freedom as minimum wages, dismissal regulations, centralized wage setting, extension of 
union contracts to no participating parties and conscription, are present across countries. In order to get 
a high rating in this index, a country must allow to “the market forces to determine wages and establish 
the conditions of hiring and firing, and refrain from the use of conscription” (Gwartney et al. 2007, p. 
12). Data on the index of hiring and firing of workers are available from the Fraser Institute. It is a sub-
component of “Regulation of Credit, Labour, and Business index”. Hire Fire index running from 1 to 7, 
it is based on the Global Competitiveness Report’s question
10: The hiring and firing of workers is 
impeded by regulations (= 1) or flexibly determined by employers (= 7).  
The “standard deviation of the inflation rate” is a variable that take into account the monetary 
policy. Inflation erodes the value of property held in monetary instruments. When governments (or 
central banks) create money to finance their expenditures they are, in effect, expropriating the property 
and violating the economic freedom of their citizens. In this sense, it is an institutional form to protect 
property rights and, thus, economic freedom.  In order to earn a high rating in this area, a country must 
follow policies and adopt institutions that lead to stable rates of inflation (Gwartney et al. 2007). This 
component is a sub-component of Area 3 of Economic Freedom index defined as “Access to Sound 
Money”. The following formula was used to determine the zero-to-10 scale rating for each country: 
(Vmax−Vi)/(Vmax−Vmin) multiplied by 10. Where Vi represents the country’s standard deviation of the 
annual rate of inflation during the last five years. The values for Vmin and Vmax were set at zero and 
25%,  respectively.  “This  procedure  will  allocate  the  highest  ratings  to  the  countries  with  least 
variation in the annual rate of inflation. A perfect 10 results when there is no variation in the rate of 
inflation over the five-year period. Ratings will decline toward zero as the standard deviation of the 
inflation rate approaches 25% annually” (Gwartney et al. 2007, p. 185)
11.  
Data on unemployment rate are extracted by the Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the 
Caribbean  (2007
12.  According  with  Tanzi  (1999),  the  effect  of  unemployment  rate  on  UE  is 
ambiguous. It is because the labour force of the UE is composed of very heterogeneous workers. One 
part of the hidden labour market is classified as unemployed but belongs to the official labour force. 
The other part of informal workers consists of retirees, minors, and homemakers who are not part of 
the official workforce.  Furthermore, there are persons who simultaneously hold an official and an 
unofficial job (Tanzi, 1999).  
The “Subsidies on GDP” variable accounts the general government transfers and subsidies as a 
share of GDP. This component of Index of Economic Freedom generates lower ratings for countries 
with  larger  transfer  sectors.  “When  the  size  of  a  country’s  transfer  sector  approaches  that  of the 
country with the largest transfer sector during the 1990 benchmark year, the rating of the country will 
approach zero. (Gwartney et al. 2007, p. 183). 
To evaluate the effect of taxes on official and unofficial GDP is used an indicator of based on 
the top marginal income tax rate by considering the income threshold at which the top marginal income 
                                                 
10  Source:  World  Economic  Forum,  Global  Competitiveness  Report  (various  issues), 
http://www.weforum.org/en/initiatives/gcp/index.htm 
11 Soruce: World Bank, World Development Indicators (various issues); International Monetary Fund, 
International Financial Statistics (various issues). 
12  Economic  Commission  for  Latina  America  and  the  Caribbean,  United  Nations: 
http://websie.eclac.cl/anuario_estadistico/anuario_2006. For unemployment rate of Guatemala in the 1990 and 2000 data 
are extracted by Worl Bank on-line database: http://devdata.worldbank.org/edstats/query/default.htm.  
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tax  rate  applies  (Tax).  It  is  one  (1D)  of  the  four  components  of  area  1  (Size  of  Government: 
Expenditures,  Taxes  and  Enterprises).  “Countries  with  high  marginal  tax  rates  and  low-income 
thresholds are rated lower” (Gwartney et al.  2007, p. 9). Although it might be useful to analyze the 
impact of three main components of tax revenue (direct, indirect, and social security contribution) 
separately,  but  the  data  limitations  has  prevented  any  possibility  of  developing  a  more  complex 
econometric framework (in terms of the number and kind of potential causes of UE).  
As  concerns  instrumental  variables  for  GMM,  other  then  some  of  previous  independent 
variables, we consider the indexes of “inflation rate” and of the “Freedom to Trade internationally” in 
regression (2) and (3) respectively. The index of “inflation rate” is extracted by Economic Freedom of 
the  World  (2007).  It is calculated by  the  following  formula:  (Vmax−Vi)/(Vmax−Vmin).  Where  the  Vi 
represents the rate of inflation during the most recent year. The values for Vmax and Vmin and are set at 
zero and 50%, respectively - the lower the rate of inflation, the higher the rating. “Countries that 
achieve perfect price stability earn a rating of 10. A zero rating is assigned to all countries with an 
inflation rate  of  50%  or  more”  (Gwartney  et  al. 2007,  p.  187).  The  index  of “Freedom  to  Trade 
Internationally” is the index of Area 4: “freedom to trade internationally” published by the Fraser 
Institute. This index running from 0 to 10 (lower numbers mean strong restrictions to international 
exchange). The components in this area are designed to measure a wide variety of restraints that affect 
international exchange: tariffs, quotas, hidden administrative restraints, and exchange rate and capital 
controls. In order to get a high rating in this area, “a country must have low tariffs, a trade sector 
larger  than  expected,  easy  clearance  and  efficient  administration  of  customs,  a  freely  convertible 
currency, and few controls on the movement of capital” (Gwartney et al. 2007, p. 11). 





                                                 
13 http://www.wider.unu.edu/research/Database/en_GB/wiid. 